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Introduction: A Historical Note 
Since the invention of aesthetics in the eighteenth century, philoso-
phers have long taken music as a paradigm case for asserting a realm that 
is beyond the reach of linguistic signification and implicated instead in an 
ineffable higher truth about the workings of the world. Whether this inter-
est took the form of Wackenroder's idealism (in which music occupied a 
pure angelic domain independent of the actual world), or Schopen-
hauer's endlessly striving Will (to which music bore the closest of all possi-
ble analogies), or Nietzsche's Dionysian strain (which represented the rap-
turous musical frenzy that destroyed the veils of maya and freed us from 
norms, images, rules and restraint), or Kierkegaard's analysis of the ab-
solutely musical (which best exemplified the highly erotic striving of the 
pure un mediated life force), music has frequently served as a discursive 
site for speculation on the limits of philosophy, knowledge, and meaning. 
A central metaphor for that which resists epistemological certainty, music 
in philosophical discourse has functioned as a kind of discourse of the un-
image, the non-significant, the unsayable par excellence. 
Less apparent, perhaps, today is the way that this kind of theorizing of 
fundamental negativity (which came out of German metaphysics) has 
impacted the current French philosophical, psychoanalytic and literary-
theoretical scene. While the explicit reference to music has receded in 
most post-structuralist writings, the form of the inquiry has not changed 
much. Like the older figure of music, the operations of deconstruction, 
for example, mark what is semantically slippery, and puzzle the divide 
between hardened historical oppositions. Coming out of the Hegelian 
principle of non-identity, what counts as meaning in the deconstructive 
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account includes what is not said, what is silenced out of discourse, and 
that which impedes narrative coherence. 
Still, despite the general evacuation of thought about the purely musi-
cal, the metaphor of music is never far away in these later writings. In 
his description of the sound of the operatic voice, for instance, Roland 
Barthes isolates that which imposes a limit on predicative language as 
the "grain of the voice," the visceral materiality that escapes linguistic sig-
nificance. Jacques Derrida works out his notion of the supplement-the 
negatively privileged term that marks a semantic excess that cannot be 
subsumed into the discourse under investigation-in the context of 
Rousseau's consideration of melody and speech in the Essai sur l'origine de 
langue. And Julia Kristeva points to the musical basis of a nonrepresenta-
tional theory of language-one in which the desemanticized "pure signi-
fier" reverberates as if in musical space. This rather complicated path in 
the history of philosophy via German metaphysics to post-structuralist 
French theory (to use shorthands) ought to disconcert both the view that 
thought about music somehow lags behind the recent theoretical develop-
ments in postmodernism, critical theory, and cultural studies, and the 
view that music figured as pure sounding-forms-in-motion, precisely the 
discourse lacking significance, is somehow the antithesis of these develop-
ments. Historically speaking, their discursive affinities are more promi-
nent than their differences. This is not to say that writers on music today 
are generally aware of music's influence on post-structuralism. On the 
contrary, the lack of historical perspective has frequently resulted in just 
the mistaken views I have mentioned. 
What happens, then, when music theory, somewhat paradoxically, turns 
(back) to post-structuralist French theory for inspiration? Listening Sub-
jects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture by David Schwarz provides one kind of 
answer. In this collection of essays, Schwarz explores the multi-capillaried 
interface between musicology and psychoanalysis on the terrains of both 
"popular" and "serious" music. Listening Subjects is a thought-provoking 
book. Schwarz is full of ideas and his musical analyses are bristling with 
tantalizing speculation. Despite the occasional anxieties about its own for-
malism, this text connects an investigation into psychoanalysis with tradi-
tional music analysis in startling and productive ways. This alone counts 
as a praiseworthy contribution to the ongoing application of literary and 
critical theory to music studies in the work of Rose Rosengard Subotnik, 
Lawrence Kramer, Gary Tomlinson, Ruth Solie, Kofi Agawu, Susan McClary, 
and Robert Fink, to name a few. Perhaps what distinguishes Schwarz from 
these authors is that he addresses questions that attempt to forge a kind of 
music theory of the body. 
Drawing on the theories of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and his 
successors Slavoj Zizek and Julia Kristeva, whose work is a reinterpretation 
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of Freud in the contexts of structuralism and post-structuralism, Schwarz 
undertakes to show how certain musical experiences frequently represent 
a host of (often unconscious) psychoanalytic dynamics. For example, 
Schwarz elaborates a hearing of John Adams's Nixon in China in terms of 
a fantasy of an archaic sense of self, enveloped in sound, before its emer-
gence into conventionality. In psychoanalytic parlance, this archaic self 
refers to the infant's state of organic needs (with a minimum of instinctual 
guidance) before it has gained a sense of itself as a spatially situated whole 
(via an imaginary ego). The initial harmonic and rhythmic familiarity and 
simplicity of Nixon in China evokes the pre-imaginary state in which one 
has direct access to the mother-a listening experience that Schwarz char-
acterizes as a fantasy thing. On the other hand, the changes in perception 
that occur through the shifts in harmonic organization and quotation in-
troduce a "conventional" dimension that severs the fantasy of the pre-
imaginary state and reminds the listener of the irreducible split between 
mother and child. Such a hearing, now characterized as a fantasy space, 
registers a kind of acoustic-mirror stage in which "the subject experiences 
a series of splits away from phenomenal experience, from the sonorous 
envelope, through the binaries of the Imaginary Order, and into the plu-
ral, dispersing signifiers of the Symbolic Order" (16). The references here 
are to Lacan's theory of the development of the human ego. In order to 
gauge the plausibility of Schwarz's account, I will briefly outline Lacan's 
theory before examining Schwarz's way of logically linking music to it. 
Finally, I will critically assess the notions of fantasy thing and fantasy space 
in some detail. 
Lacan's Theory 
According to Lacan, an integrated sense of self begins to form when 
the infant finds reflected back to itself a satisfyingly unified image with 
which it identifies. Although this image is essentially an alien fiction, a 
metaphor, a fictive self constructed through misrecognition, the infant is 
wholly absorbed in the identification. Thus the infant moves in a ceaseless 
closed circuit between imagined object and subject. Caught in "a jubilant 
assumption of his specular image" (Lacan 1977: 2), the infant is unable to 
tell the two apart. 
Lacan extends the operations of this "imaginary order" well beyond the 
purview of the developing subject, especially in his critique of "philosophi-
cal idealism" -a form of knowledge that involves a kind of mirroring or 
picturing of that which is outside the consciousness of the knower. Follow-
ing Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, Lacan disengages from 
any kind of investigation predicated on a unitary self or a consciousness 
set over and above the social network in which it emerges. For Lacan, 
knowledge, like the self, comes into being (at its very beginning) within a 
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symbolic matrix, a conceptual scheme that anticipates its lineaments. 
Thus, Lacan insists on the predetermining role played by language in the 
formation of knowledge of the world. 
The analogy between this non-idealist philosophical stance and Lacan's 
description of developing subjectivity is found in the "symbolic order." 
Here the child encounters the figure of the father (or the "Law") and rec-
ognizes that it is merely a part of a wide familial and social system of rela-
tions. The child's undifferentiated relationship with the mother becomes 
mediated by language while its bodily union with the mother is opened up 
to unconscious desire. Thus the appearance of the Law inaugurates the 
repression of desire that constitutes the unconscious. Instead of being pre-
linguistic and instinctual (in the manner of Sigmund Freud), the uncon-
scious is an effect of language-indeed, it is structured like one, for lan-
guage is that which "hollows being into desire" (Eagleton 1983: 167-68); it 
divides up the fullness one knows in the imaginary, and irrevocably severs 
the subject from an experience of unmediated reality. Access to such real-
ity, like access to the mother's body, is no longer direct; the child is 
plunged into the primary repression of desire. This movement in which 
fullness of meaning perpetually fades (or where signified constantly 
"slides beneath" signifier) is the unconscious. 
Paradoxically, Lacan calls this inaccessible realm (always beyond the 
reach of signification) the "real," thereby destabilizing the customary 
meaning of the term. Far from representing reality in the objective sense, 
the real is that which eludes conceptualization. It is revealed precisely in 
those moments when the signifying system is considered inadequate and 
the subject is put into a relation of desire to unreachable objects. Despite 
the permanent separation from the mother and from the plenitude of the 
imaginary order, the subject seeks to fulfill his desire through a substitute 
object. Such an object, which Lacan refers to as the objet a, has a metony-
mic relation to the original experience of union with the mother. It can 
never lead to the ultimate source of total fulfillment, nor can the subject 
ever know what this unconscious object-of-partial-fulfillment is. It is the 
radically contingent thing that interferes with any network of signs that 
tries to pin it down and is thus necessarily outside of language. Only 
through an experience of the impossibility of reaching out for or repre-
senting the object of desire does the subject gain a vague expectation of 
the true dimensions of it. Hence the real emerges in a kind of mismatch 
between the symbolic and the imaginary orders, the moment when the 
limits of signifying practice issue forth desire. 
Listening Subjects and the Problem with Representation 
One might expect that a psychoanalytic inquiry into the subject of 
listening-whether this focuses on the listening subject or on the subjec-
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tion of/through listening-would make much of the extra-linguistic di-
mensions associated with the unconscious. For, as a continual activity of 
sliding signifiers whose exact meanings (signifieds) are beyond reach, this 
model of the unconscious can, historically speaking, be said to have ge-
nealogical links to an essentially musical one. However, Schwarz's ap-
proach offers a different perspective. Instead of figuring the terrain of the 
absolutely musical as analogous to the movements of the unconscious per 
se, his musical analyses, which for the most part are beholden to texted 
music, usually take the argumentative form of some or other musical "rep-
resentation" of a Lacanian process. 
Thus, for example, the real becomes the focus of Schwarz's interpreta-
tion of the Beatles' use of white noise at the end of their song "I Want You 
(She's So Heavy)." The connection of this noise to the real is that of repre-
sentation. Schwarz asserts, "The wall of noise is a representation of the 
Lacanian concept of the Real as both fantasy thing and space" (31).1 By 
prolonging the noise of the guitars for three minutes-beyond what, for 
Schwarz, could credibly pass as a symbol of frustration-the "white noise 
suggests a nightmarish nothingness within male desire." Thus, "quantity 
produces a qualitative shift from the symbolic to the Real" (35). (To assist 
the reader, Schwarz likens this to the grotesque facial images of Cindy 
Sherman and to Zizek's analysis of Alfred Hitchcock's film The Birds. For 
Schwarz, Sherman's photographs, which arbitrarily assemble various rep-
resentations of facial parts into a hideous whole, are "a representation of 
the pulp that lies just beneath the surface of the face" (32), while the dev-
astating and overwhelming presence of birds in The Birds "renders the 
birds Real" (35). Analogously, the lengthy segment of noise in the song, to 
which the guitars seem unmoved and indifferent, exceeds symbolic inter-
pretation and is transformed into a representation ofthe real.)2 
But if the real is that which lies outside of the imaginary and in the fis-
sures of the symbolic (and thus necessarily beyond the reach of represen-
tation) how is the real represented in the song? Or is this a representation of 
the unrepresentable? If so, can all white noise produce such a super-
signifying maneuver? Or does the song's text give us the necessary clues? 
This is where Schwarz's understanding of the real needs to be scrutinized. 
According to Schwarz, "the Real is an inscrutable force or thing beyond 
the limits of sensory or linguistic representations. It cannot be heard, 
seen, or named directly since the Real is that which supports but evades 
signification. Yet, in the fissures of some representations, it can and does 
appear, as in the 'face' [created by Cindy Sherman]" (32). It is worth con-
sidering what kind of fissure Schwarz has in mind here: "If we subtracted 
all our experiences from our lives," he explains, "all our patterns of sen-
sory and linguistic understanding, all social conventions, all cultural mem-
ories, all personal and collective identities, all historical contexts, we 
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would be left with the Real" (32). It is not only that this notion of the real 
is undermined three paragraphs later when Schwarz proposes that the 
real is linked to, not severed from, culture and convention-indeed it "is 
clearest when it is attached to conventional representations in social 
space" (34)-but that this notion of the real resonates, if at all, more with 
Freud than with Lacan. Far from the remainder when history, culture, 
symbolic systems, and convention are somehow subtracted away, Lacan's 
real is instantiated precisely in the social moment, where signifying con-
ventions beget desire. Under Schwarz's definition of the real, the noise in 
the Beatles song becomes a kind of pre-linguistic, instinctual, inarticulate 
din whose most obvious interpretation is simply the narrator's frustration 
-a "nightmarish nothingness within male desire" (35). The sound of the 
song's ending supports such a reading, for, unlike Hitchcock's overwhelm-
ing birds, the white noise remains in balance with the guitars throughout. 
Is it an exaggeration then to call this a representation of Lacan's real? Or 
has Lacan's real become too "real" (in the so-called ordinary sense) under 
Schwarz's gaze? 
In chapters 3 and 4, Schwarz turns his attention to the songs of Franz 
Schubert. In an innovative encounter between Lacan and Schenker, 
Schwarz examines "Der Doppelganger" and "Ihr Bild" from Schwanen-
gesang in light of ideas such as mirror misrecognition, the uncanny, and 
the drive. For example, in "Der Doppelganger" the narrator's confronta-
tion with his own double in the second stanza is analyzed in terms of the 
psychoanalytic gaze. Lacan's concept of the gaze (regard) is shaped by 
Sartre's claims in Being and Nothingness that "my fundamental connection 
with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my perma-
nent possibility of being seen by the Other" (Sartre 1992: 256-57). The gaze 
identifies the subject as essentially a "given-to-be-seen" (Lee 1990: 157). In 
other words, to grasp subjectivity outside of myself entails the reality of be-
ing looked at. Lacan makes this Sartrean goal explicit: "What we have to 
circumscribe ... is the pre-existence of the gaze-I see only from one 
point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides" (1990: 156). Yet 
the gaze is not substantially tied to the actual presence of another object 
or subject manifesting the gaze; in fact, it is "invisible" and anonymous. 
Like the role of Das Man (the They) in Heidegger's Being and Time, 
Lacan's gaze is the outside structuring activity-"the Other watching me" 
-that lays down the conditioning grounds of the subject's existence. 
According to Schwarz, "the musical signifier of the gaze [in "Der 
Doppelganger"] is the pitch class F#, which is ubiquitous in the music," 
while "the musical signifier of recognition is the pitch class G as upper 
neighbor to F#" (66). It is true that the climactic G5 in m. 41 articulates 
the "eig'ne Gestalt" with which the narrator is ultimately faced, but it is 
less clear why the repeated Fh signifY the structure of the gaze. In 
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Schenkerian terms, the way in which F# elaborates scale degree 5 projects 
a kind of fixation or stasis: an inability to unhinge the vocal line from its 
opening repetitions. Textually, this seems to conjure first the stillness of 
the night in which the poem is launched, and second, a hitherto still-
latent inertia of obsession and melancholy. Like the house at which he is 
staring, the narrator (still) finds himself standing "auf dem selben Platz" 
[in the same place] in Heine's poem. Harmonic activity is kept to a mini-
mum and the melodic line circles tirelessly around F#l. Finally in m. 25, 
the melody begins on a note other than F#l. This is the moment in which 
another person enters the scene: the moment in the text that might plau-
sibly suggest the drama of the gaze. This is the stanza in which the 
melodic line is unhinged from its repetitiousness and becomes energized 
in an upward sweep into m. 42. Thus, far from "signifying the gaze," F# 
seems to signal a kind of brooding stasis that precedes the imagined pres-
ence of another. And this presence is felt precisely by departing from F#. 
Given the social emphasis on the structuring activity of the gaze, it may 
be inappropriate to explain this romantic experience of a double in these 
Lacanian terms. While the registral sweep from m. 25 to m. 41 ultimately 
settles on the pitches F# and G again, as if to lay bare the structure of the 
narrator's fixation, the process seems more narcissistic than social. Mter 
all, the gaze of the narrator's double is diverted (staring at the sky), while 
the Lacanian gaze is directed at the subject from a multitude of perspec-
tives. More importantly, can the Lacanian gaze appropriately be signified by 
a pitch class? If the gaze is a kind of presentiment that lies behind con-
scious experience, the effect of which is manifested in that experience 
without itself being readily accessible to consciousness, can it be experi-
enced through this repeated note? Or is F# a representation, once again, 
of the gaze? If so, why is the invisible and inaccessible gaze represented by 
that which is ubiquitous and compulsively repetitious; by the sound that is 
closest and clearest to our ears? 
Another problem with Schwarz's "representational" stance here and 
elsewhere in the book is that it does not bear the weight of the post-
Freudian psychoanalytic apparatus at all levels of argument. Thus, while 
psychoanalysis in recent literary theory has served to disengage from inter-
pretations of literary works as "expressions," "representations," or "reflec-
tions" of reality (understanding them instead as forms of production that 
effect a way of perceiving the world), Schwarz recapitulates the form of 
the former interpretations even if the "reality" his Schubert songs "repre-
sent" has been replaced by the real, the drive, or the gaze. It is as if these 
psychoanalytic modalities had already been established (thus functioning 
as the argument's signified) and the music was a representation (or signi-
fier) of them. This pattern of thought, a site of desire all of its own, per-
vades the book. 
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Example I: Franz Schubert, "Der Doppelganger." 
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In the discussion of "Der Doppelganger," for example, Schwarz asserts 
that "E minor is the music's objet a, the signifier of the music's irreducible 
alterity" (70). In the discussion of Primus's cover version of Peter Gabriel's 
song "Intruder," a "listening gaze," whereby "the music [is] listening to 
us," is evoked "through the pounding bass guitar and percussion that ac-
companies the text throughout, sounding just on our side of the listening 
plane" (97). Elsewhere, in a portion of Diamanda Galas's Plague Mass, 
"B-flat signifies ... the abjection of the voice stripped of its signifYing func-
tion" (156). Thus the objet a, the gaze and the abject are all positively elab-
orated by some musical sound: the suggested tonality of E minor, the 
pounding of a guitar and drums, and the note B~, respectively. Strictly 
speaking, this is not theoretically possible. The objet a, for instance, which 
by Ziiek's account "is not a positive entity existing in space ... [but] ulti-
mately nothing but a certain curvature of the space itself which causes us 
to make a bend precisely when we want to get directly to the object" 
(160), exceeds signification; its presence is experienced only in the nega-
tive form of its consequences. 
Perhaps one interesting implication of Schwarz's positive account of 
the objet a is the suggestion that the very act of hinting at a modulation 
somehow elaborates a certain curvature of musical space. Thus, a musical 
passage's objet a is partly revealed when it seems to behave as if under the 
influence of a new key without actually stating it. This suggestion is tanta-
lizing and may be worth exploring. With "Ihr Bild" in mind, for example, 
there is an interesting moment, deeply embedded within the narrator's vi-
sion of the beloved's seemingly living expressions, where the music seems 
to swerve from the possibility of changing mode. To begin with, the music 
contrasts stark octaves in B~ minor of "Ich stand in dunklen Traumen und 
starrt' ihr Bildniss an" [I stood in deep dreams and stared at her picture] 
with the naive, warm, and obedient chorale harmonization in the parallel 
major of "und das geliebte Antlitz heimlich zu leben begann" [and the 
beloved image secretly began to live], and so sets up a modal opposition 
between the quiet stasis of dream-like staring, on the one hand, and the 
exquisite satisfaction of secret fantasy, on the other. But, unlike its minor 
counterpart, the major-mode material reveals a vulnerability to inflection 
by the minor throughout the piece. In mm. 10 and 12, for instance, the 
chromatic A~ briefly reflects the mode of contrast in phrases that are 
otherwise candidly in Bb major. (In m. 10, the A~ relates to C minor-to 
which triad it moves in mm. 10-11-and in m. 12 it relates to E~ major.) 
When the turn to B~ minor becomes more pronounced in mm. 15-16 (as 
the beloved's lips appear to move), the music turns out to be really be-
coming G~ major. No longer even noticing the fantastical dimension 
of what he sees, the narrator is drawn still deeper into the object of 
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contemplation: "Urn ihre Lippen zog sich ein Uicheln wunderbar" 
[around her lips appeared a wonderful smile]. 
It is in the next phrase that the music seems to swerve away from be-
coming minor once more. On the last beat of m. 20, a chromatic passing 
tone in the bass produces a flat-iv chord in G~ minor, but it is denied any 
consequence. It is as if, after eluding the turn to B~ minor in previous 
measures by elaborating G~ major, the analogous possibility that minor 
can haunt major in a different key as well must be repressed to sustain the 
secret phantasmic activity. The passage continues in G~ major, as if noth-
ing had happened, by imitating mm. 17-18 almost exactly. At this point, 
the narrator's vision has been enfolded by another layer of unreality; he 
begins to probe the imagined reason for the beloved's imagined tears-
"und wie von Wehmuthsthranen erglanzte ihr Augenpaar" [and, as if with 
tears of sorrow, her eyes shone]. The point is that, while the previous 
phrase (mm. 15-18) takes seriously the possibility of changing mode, this 
one (mm. 19-22) represses it, and so betrays the desire to hold onto the 
major mode at all costs. Of course, G~ major is more closely related to B~ 
minor than it is to B~ major, which (despite the music's efforts to avoid 
the sound of it) predestines the return of the minor to some extent. Also, 
the moment G~ major seems to slip away in m. 20 (with a major-to-minor 
sub dominant progression partly analogous to mm. 10 and 12), the chro-
matically descending bass line (E~-EIJ,-D~) also juxtaposes the enharmonic 
equivalents of the m~or and minor thirds of Bk And the fragility of this 
sustained fantasy (supported by a failure to modulate, by the haunting 
proximity of B~ minor, and by faint references to both versions of the B~ 
triad) is revealed in the next gestures (mm. 23-24) when the music is 
roughly yanked back to B~ minor and the narrator finds himself reflecting 
on his own fixated condition once more.3 The point is that this swerve 
away from the option of modulating may be figured in terms of a kind of 
musical bend away from the reality of one's condition on account of de-
sire; a kind of paradoxical objet a. This is not to say that the C~-minor triad, 
for example, represents the objet a, but that the failure to change mode in its 
presence discloses the dimensions of that desire. 
This kind of approach to the psychoanalytic dimensions of music could 
be broadened to include all musical moments (not only not-modulating 
ones) that reflect something out of kilter with what is readily apparent as a 
syntactical norm of the piece or as a stylistic convention. It is worth point-
ing out that some recent music theory, while it has not overtly identified 
itself as psychoanalytically oriented, is preoccupied with just these kinds of 
moments. For example, in a fascinating essay, "Contradictory Criteria in a 
Work by Brahms," Joseph Dubiel (without Lacan on his mind) elaborates 
an exemplary case of the kind of orientation I have in mind. He coins the 
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Example 2: Franz Schubert, "Ihr Bild." 
fti Langsam 
.. .. 
l~ I I I I 
leh stand in dunk-len Trau - men und starrt' ihr Bild - niss 
II 








~ I r I 
an, und das ge-lieb - te Ant litz 
II 1...--.. 
: 











heim - lich zu Ie - ben be - gann. Urn 
.11 L I~l .1 _L 
~ 
'r=- ~",. ..... T~~ 'd'. I pp 
. LJ q"'kt = ::::::=-
-: Ii I I I 
-
: : 




. II L 
~ ~h r I I I re Lip pen zog sich ein La cheln wun def - bar, und 
II I 
~ I I I I I~~ I 
ev>. l j. J hft .. .a-. 
: 
MARTIN SCHERZINGER 107 





~ I. r 
-
1 
wle von Weh - muths - thra - nen er glanz - te ihr Au geo paar. 
1\ 
: 
~ 1 ~~ I"---'r I I~~ ,.. . 
--== =-- --== ===--
fOO 
-
~.J.. J ~-ft 





~ 1 1 1 
Auch mei - ne Thrii - nen flos sen mir von den Wan-gen her-
1\ 








ab und ach, ich kann es nicht glau ben, dass ich 
II 1 1 1 l 1 1 1,..--., 1 
: 







..../ ~ ~ .. ~~ .. ~~ ~: 
m.33 
II i f."\ 
~ 
dich ver 10 - ren hab'. 
II 1 1--- r-"1 ;----"'1 1 r:'I 
~ T ~",. 
-; , ~~. ~ qj v~ 
LJ q~_b'" 
-'"-: : 
I ~ I ~ • # • . ~ 
108 CURRENT MUSICOLOGY 
term abnorrn to capture "definably irregular events that become criteria of 
prolongation or succession in violation of larger norms of the pieces in 
which they occur" (Dubiel 1994: 82). In the same way that Lacan's real is 
only partially divulged in the moment that signifying systems falter as a re-
sult of an ever-elusive objet a, the expressive identity of a musical work is 
partially divulged when an abnorrn seems to interfere with the network of 
musical norms. To my mind, an analytic approach that is vigilant about 
those musical moments that elude normative paradigms shares more 
philosophical ground with psychoanalysis than does one whose musical 
events represent psychoanalytic modalities. 
It is crucial to point out that these abnormal moments are experienced 
and conceptualized in negative terms, when something in the music 
seems to flounder, bend, stoop, equivocate, hesitate, halt, confound, or 
protrude. In his account of the anomalous repeated D:~s near the begin-
ning of Beethoven's Violin Concerto, for example, Dubiel describes an ex-
perience that bears the weight of acknowledging what does not happen to 
the D#s. This permits a hearing that is beholden to neither a paradigm 
that wants to alleviate what is problematic about the anomalous tones nor 
an analysis that anticipates hearing any particular thing, like a "direct con-
nection to the pitch (or pitch class) D#" (Dubiel 1996: 44). Instead, this 
more "ad hoc" than "principled" attitude opens the realm of possibility for 
what might count as hearing under the influence of those weird D#s 
(1996: 44). Radically unpredictive and radically ungeneral, Dubiel's ap-
proach is alert to events (and non-events) that are not given by stylistic 
norms, on the one hand, and to descriptions of these that are not given 
by ready-to-hand music-theoretical paradigms, on the other. This kind of 
analysis is a critical gesture. Beholden to the radically contingent aspects 
of a particular musical piece, and thereby to its absolute peculiarity, it di-
alectically challenges the control of those normative generalities within 
which the piece operates. Despite its seemingly formalist account of the 
notes alone then, this interest in marking what is recalcitrant to contex-
tual standards established by musical sounds is, in fact, not far away from 
Lacan's psychoanalytic interest in the mismatch between the imaginary 
and the symbolic orders. It is worth reconsidering the work of Dubiel, 
David Lewin, Andrew Mead, Marion Guck, Fred Maus, Benjamin Boretz, 
Suzanne Cusick, and others, in these terms. 
This is why the "representational" stance in Listening Subjects is so prob-
lematic. It tends to disengage from such dialectical considerations and an-
alyzes music's relation to psychoanalysis by way of one-to-one mappings. 
To take a paradoxical example from the analysis of Diamanda Galas: how 
does a note "signifY" the abjection that "erases boundaries among ... sig-
nifYing categories" (157)? The traditional roles ~f music and language 
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have been dramatically reversed here. Schwarz grants music the power to 
signiry and represent in positive terms that which eludes signification, 
while linguistic signifiers are caught in a kind of musical sliding. So, while 
Lacan's model of language inherits the lineaments of the nineteenth-
century philosophical figuration of music, Schwarz's "Lacanian" hearing 
of music inherits the lineaments of a pre-Lacanian model of language. 
The discourse traditionally lacking significance signifies and the tradition-
ally signifying discourse becomes pure movement. The priorities have 
been reversed with frequently paradoxical results. 
A second problem with the "representational" stance is the way in 
which it all too often produces analyses that uphold a passive view of the 
psychodynamics at work. If musical processes represent psychoanalytic ones, 
they cannot move beyond them, mark their limits, or offer a space for radi-
cal contingency. This is troubling, if only because the work of art for 
Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Kristeva (not to mention the musical 
work for Wackenroder, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard) is en-
dowed with just this rupturing potential. For Lacan, for example, painting 
provides a way out of the alienation of the gaze. By resisting the gaze 
through the intervention of the real in painting, the viewer is able to ac-
cept the subjectifYing effect of the gaze and thus be freed from his/her 
search for satisfaction through fantasy. In contrast, Schwarz's music 
mainly subjects. The music is passively linked to some or other self-identical 
psychoanalytic dynamic: Schubert's "Der Doppelganger" "is a musical 
representation of ... [the] Lacanian enjoyment [jouissance]" (69); Peter 
Gabriel's "Intruder" "represents ... [the] language-bound fantasy of 
power" (93-94); Diamanda Galas's cries and declamations are "represen-
tations of abjection" (160); and so on. Unless the analyses can be moved 
out of the logic of "representation" nothing else is foreseeable. An abject 
musicology has not yet had its day. 
Reconsidering Hearing as Fantasy Thing and Fantasy Space 
What exactly is happening to the body when one listens to music? Why, 
for example, does David Schwarz get goose bumps when he hears Bruck-
ner's Ninth in Hamburg's Musikhalle? Schwarz makes the wonderful and 
provocative suggestion that it is because he is crossing a threshold be-
tween two psychoanalytic registers-fantasy thing and fantasy space. In 
this case, he shuttles between fantasy space and fantasy thing; he thus 
"crosse[s] the threshold between [his] clearly marked-off adult body and a 
fantasy of a familiar but archaic body less distinctly marked off from the 
external world than its adult counterpart" (8). The experience of this 
more blurred body, issued forth by the "oceanic" effect of the symphony's 
resonance in the Musikhalle, is "made possible" by an early childhood 
110 CURRENT MUSICOLOGY 
experience-the sounds of the maternal voice, which Schwarz likens to 
what Guy Rosolato calls "a sonorous womb, a murmuring house" (8). To 
my way of thinking, this might be one interesting starting point for an ac-
count of the goose bumps insofar as it opens up many compelling paths of 
music-analytic inquiry. 
On the other hand, there are confusions and inconsistencies that fre-
quently make it difficult to follow Schwarz's meaning. For example, is this 
hearing-this experience of a phantasmic return to the pre-Oedipal state 
(lacking any defined self) with bumps marking the impossible transition 
to skinlessness-an experience of a fantasy thing} Or is the crossing a fan-
tasy space? The former is suggested by the assertion that such hearing is 
a "representation of having been one with the mother" (8), and the latter 
is suggested by the assertion that the "threshold crossing" is itself "a crucial 
component of listening as space" (8). Alternatively, are these perhaps two 
ways of hearing the same music? But even so, this does not solve the 
dilemma, because a host of logically independent ideas and values are 
freighted by the definitions of these terms. It is worth examining more 
closely what Schwarz means by "fantasy thing," or, in more appropriate 
parlance, how it is different from "fantasy space." 
The first definition reads: "Listening as a fantasy thing is produced 
when attributes of a structure represented in music are described and re-
lated to one another" (4). Joining forces with the new musicologists here, 
Schwarz implies that the fantasy thing is formal music analysis-a descrip-
tion of structural attributes of music (3-4). For example, describing "The 
Star-Spangled Banner" as a composed-out overtone series produces a 
"fantasy of a listening thing" because it proceeds as if the overtone series 
and the pitch structure of the song "were objectively 'there' on the page, 
in the music, in our ears" (4). Without worrying about what these objec-
tives might mean, it seems that listening as a fantasy thing, at this stage of 
the story, involves naturalizing something (not inherently stable) and de-
scribing it. 
Fantasy space, in contrast, is produced when "musical-theoretical, 
musical-historical, cultural, psychoanalytic, or personal thresholds are 
crossed and enunciated" (4). Thus we pass beyond a limit of some kind 
and express that in some way. So, when we realize that the "natural status" 
of the overtone series is partly an ideological construction, for instance, 
we cross the threshold "between pitch structure, form, and musical lan-
guage, on the one hand, and a historical context that makes pitch struc-
ture, form and musical language possible, on the other" (4). Thus, fantasy 
space involves knowing the historical context that made our thing possible 
and a residual sense that we were duped by this thing (under a certain nat-
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uralized gaze). But what is this naturalized thing? Is it the overtone series 
-the thing we seem to transform when we come to know it as historically 
conditioned? What happened to the "composing-out" part? Did we al-
ready know that that was not natural in the same way as the series was; that 
it was artistically made (even made-up) and therefore inherently un-thing-
like? If so, the overtone series, and not the song, is argumentatively rele-
vant to the distinction between fantasy thing and fantasy space and not, 
as previously asserted, that the thing was a matter of describing structural 
relations. 
Here is a checklist of characteristics of these two terms: "[A] fantasy 
thing can be formalistic, 'whole,' hierarchical, subordinate, transhistorical, 
'purely' textual; [while] a fantasy space can be heterogeneous, fragmented, 
coordinated, culture specific, and personally specific" (4). So the fantasy 
thing is a hearing that is wholly immanent, where all the elements seem to 
persist within a system and there is no detaching the event from its mean-
ing. It inhabits a world of plenitude, without lack or exclusion. Signifier 
and signified clamp together in a mutually exhaustive embrace and never 
the twain shall part-in short, an acoustic likeness to Lacan's mirror stage. 
"Given its retrospective structure," Schwarz writes, "the sonorous envelope 
can be described as a thing, an immanent experience whose features rep-
resent how we imagine the sonorous envelope might have sounded" (8). 
But why is the immanent experience given by the retrospective structure of 
the sonorous envelope? Because, the argument goes, it is a fantasy-"a 
representation of an experience to which neither I nor anyone else can 
have direct access" (8). But what kind of immanence is imaginable here? 
What kind of immanence is a representation of something to which we have 
no direct access? Has this description of the thing already crossed the thresh-
old? Does it already know the irreducible absence? 
Another sentence about the fantasy thing reads: "Music represents the 
sonorous envelope as a fantasy thing when there are one-to-one corre-
spondences between musical details and an archaic oceanic fantasy" (8). 
Conjuring the philosophical truth-by-correspondence, Schwarz's musical 
thing maps musical details to an archaic fantasy. But what kind of one-to-
oneness do we hear here? What are the corresponding oceanic details? Is 
enough surprise being expressed at the fact that this substantialist site of 
one-to-one correspondences (where we find a plenitude of positive terms) 
is at once the same as the production of a description of the structural re-
lations of a piece of music (which was our first definition of fantasy 
thing)? How is the fantasy thing beholden to both a substantialist and a 
structuralist account? This becomes still more puzzling when, for example, 
Schwarz reads the threshold crossing in Steve Reich's Different Trains as 
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one "between clear denotative language and fantasies of prelinguistic 
sounds" (19). Now the substantialist moment is opposed to the prelinguistic. 
What I am trying to say is that the writer is crowding the definition of 
"fantasy thing" with characteristics that are in tension with one another. 
The same problem accrues to the definition of "fantasy space." "Music rep-
resents the sonorous envelope as a fantasy space when attributes of the 
thing are related to other conventional registers in which the subject finds 
him/herself" (8). Schwarz coins and then frequently repeats the related 
phrase "emergence into conventionality"; it proves to be decisive for his 
musical analyses, and for the phenomenon of crossing the threshold. I 
should mention that I am a bit disturbed by what happens to ideology as 
the account progresses, or rather, by what does not happen. Where the 
first definition of fantasy space involved an ideological unmasking of the 
naturalized thing, the later definitions merely "relate [the thing] to con-
ventional registers [like] my adult self-awareness and all the baggage asso-
ciated with my social identity" (8, italics added). 
It is perhaps not surprising that the only music in the book that is ex-
amined in terms of ideological interpellation (Althusser's Marxist use of 
psychoanalysis) is music with which the author does not seem to identity-
in this case, that of right-wing German skinheads. Addressing the question 
whether the recent turn away from "right-wing ideology" (128) by Die 
bohse Onkelz is "genuine or [whether it is] a screen for continuing the 
right-wing politics that lie behind the music" (128), Schwarz maintains 
that the same ideology persists; that the euphemisms efface what they in 
fact underline. "I hear," he writes "a continuum in which lyrics move from 
explicit to implicit representations of Oi subjectivity" (128). Thus, a song 
like "Heilige Lieder" really suggests "hidden aggression behind its surface 
mourning" (129). But the evidence for this assertion is not convincing. 
The text has no literal referent and is open to many readings: "Hier sind 
die sussesten Noten jenseits des Himmels / heilige Lieder aus berufenem 
Mund / wahre Worte im Djungel der Luge / das Licht im Dunkel ein 
heiliger Bund" [Here are the sweetest notes this side of heaven / holy 
songs from appointed mouths / true words in a jungle of lies / a light in 
the darkness, a holy offering] (117, Schwarz's translation). Nor does the 
music analysis suggest anything inherently fascist. Does the certainty on 
the matter answer to another need by asserting its own non-racism via the 
clear sighting, against odds, of a fascist ideology? The text falls prey to the 
process it is criticizing. Like the fear these musicians have of the chamele-
onic powers of the foreigner-the latter's ability to insinuate him/herself 
into German society4-we are warned about the insinuating powers of Oi 
song and its inherent fascism (whatever the surface appearance). Who is 
being protected in this account? Does foreclosing the matter like this de-
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flect attention from another kind of ideological critique? For example, is 
this chapter on ideology thus opposed to-or in sync with-the process of 
capitalist modernization? 
Let me return to the sonorous fantasy space and its relation to musical 
examples. The argument is made that much minimalist music relies on 
"oceanic" sounding structures, particularly "familiar and simple rhythmic 
structures with ... groupings of eighth and sixteenth notes" and "pitch con-
tent" that derives from "traditional harmonies from the canon" (9). So, 
the opening of John Adams's opera Nixon in China "creates a fantasy of 
the sonorous envelope as thing through very repetitive and metrically reg-
ular fragments, on the one hand, and irregular entrances of sustained 
pitches, on the other" (9). Ignoring the fact that the sustained pitches in 
the upper voice are not irregular-they enter mostly at regular groups of 
six eighth notes yielding a 3:4 cross-rhythm with the scales-two questions 
emerge: Does the fantasy thing now involve a dynamic between regularity 
and irregularity? And/Or does it involve the "familiar but archaic quality" 
of the pitches and rhythms-the triadic harmony and the diatonic scales, 
the accompanying figuration elevated to a primary position, and so on? 
If the latter, is the familiar-but-archaic quality a measure of the nostalgia 
for the womb or of a historical style? Or does a kind of musical phylogeny 
(evolution of a musical style) recapitulate ontogeny (origin and develop-
ment of an individual)? Or, more mischievously, does the womb resonate 
a regular triadic harmony, perhaps a ringing of the archetypal overtone 
series? Necessarily not, of course; but what then? Maybe it cannot be ex-
plained without falling prey to that small objet a; that bone stuck in the 
throat that reminds us of the insurmountable gap between representation 
and thing; that scapegoat that marks the metaphysical enclosure-Lacan's 
signification-resisting impossible real. But maybe it cannot be explained 
because of other impediments. 
The narrative on Nixon in China continues: "With the e# [in the bass] 
in m. 31, Adams hints at a cycle of major thirds as an organizing principle" 
(9). Therefore, because the e# hints at a cycle of thirds as an organizing 
principle in the music, the music gradually opens into sonorous space. 
Additionally, "conventional materials emerge gradually during ... the 
piece" (9). How are we to understand the "conventional" here? Is it the 
"shift in perception of the harmonic organization of the music" that hap-
pens because of the e#; or is it the distilling of an organizing principle 
(that is, the cycle ofthirds) in an otherwise so-called imaginary flow? What 
is this convention's context? Where are its borders? As far as I can see, the 
"convention" emerges precisely in the internal structural dynamics of the 
work, and it is this shift in the harmonic structure that opens up fantasy 
space. What has happened? Formalism, the phantasmic "thing sound," has 
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turned into culturally informed "space sound"-a different kind of thresh-
old crossing. It is as if the imaginary order historically recalls canons and 
traditions while the symbolic order refers internally-a case of son beget-
ting father. What has happened to the "historical context [of the book's 
introduction] that makes pitch structure, form, and musical language pos-
sible" (4)? I should not leave unnoticed the fact that hearing C# as struc-
turing a pattern in major thirds depends on the possibility of hearing sym-
metrical relations as equivalent-an interpretation that some may feel is 
disconcerted by the diatonic surroundings. (Is the perceptual revision at 
bass note F of the same order as that at bass note C#? What about the bass 
C-natural in mm. 18-21 that precedes C#? Did it sound dominant-ish ofF? 
Or was the cycle suggested at this point structured in diatonic thirds, and 
then perhaps revised in m. 31 into a symmetrically equivalent one?) There 
is more to be said about this C#, nothing as problematic as the fact that a 
cycle of major thirds opens into convention. 
Finally, the text asserts that there is something else that disconcerts the 
stability of the musical text and issues forth a hearing as fantasy space, 
namely "the emergence of half-formed quotes-not so much of specific 
pieces, but more an appropriation of a preexisting style" (9). The author 
illustrates the point with two examples of indirect quotation: Alban Berg 
and John Adams both quoting Wagner. Direct examples include the com-
posers George Rochberg and Luciano Berio, where "everything in the mu-
sical text points to previous styles, previous pieces, or cliches from other 
eras" (13). Do these cliches from other eras have a "familiar and archaic" 
ring? Have we heard this before? In a different register? Was that hearing 
imaginary or is it the symbolic charged with convention? Symptomatically, 
the opening of Nixon in China has changed at this point in the narration; 
now it is merely "oceanic, undifferentiated texture' (13). Gone are the "tra-
ditional harmonies from the canon," disappeared are the "rhythmic struc-
tures" that sound like the "accompanying figuration" of "canonic music" 
(9). Perhaps the canon is not a convention; or perhaps the undifferenti-
ated is a tradition; or perhaps we are committed to the oblivion of contra-
diction after alP 
Notes 
1. I will not adhere to Schwarz's convention of capitalizing Lacan's term "real." 
2. Lacan's figuration of the real also has a historical link to Immanuel Kant's 
notion of the sublime as described in Critique of Judgment. 
3. It is important to point out that hearing this moment as a swerve away from 
the opportunity to modulate depends on noticing mm. 15-18 as yielding to that 
possibility. This, to my mind, is what distinguishes the chromatic inflection in m. 
20 from those in mm. 10 and 12. Only after hearing the move to the contrast key 
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succeed in the previous phrase does the one in mm. 19-22 feel like an evasion. On 
the other hand, the tenuousness of the B~-major music (embedded in the key of 
B~ minor) makes it sound like the return of the octaves in m. 25 is all too due. I 
would like to thank Joe Dubiel for prompting me to refine my analysis of "Ihr 
Bild." 
4. Storkraft, for instance, sings "Fremde Volker mischen sich ein und be-
haupten auch noch Deutsch zu sein" [Foreign peoples mix themselves in and then 
also claim to be Germans]. 
5. I would like to thank Joseph Dubiel, Lydia Goehr, Jason Royal, and John Ito 
for their helpful suggestions. 
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